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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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8 APRIL 1970

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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
8 April 1970
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 30 MARCH - 5 APRIL 1970

Moscow (3899 items)

Moscow WPC Meeting on	(--)	7%
Lenin Centenary		
Hungarian Liberation	(--)	7%
Anniversary		
Indochina	(8%)	6.5%
[Vietnam	(3%)	3%]
[Laos	(2%)	1%]
[Cambodia	(1%)	0.3%]
China	(6%)	5%
Podgorny in Iran	(9.5%)	5%
Middle East	(6%)	3%
Supreme Soviet	(4%)	2%
Elections		

Peking (3250 items)

Indochina	(58%)	57%
[Cambodia	(52%)	55%]
[Laos	(5%)	1%]
[Vietnam	(1%)	1%]
Domestic Issues	(23%)	23%
[Ninth CCP Congress	(--)	13%]
First Anniversary		
Death of Anna Louise	(--)	3%
Strong		
Middle East	(6%)	2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

The 1 April French cabinet statement expressing concern about spread of the Vietnam war to Laos and Cambodia and proposing general negotiations leading to "a zone of neutrality and peace" has drawn no comment in communist media to date. TASS carried a brief, factual report promptly on the 2d, but other communist propaganda has not even acknowledged the statement. Both the DRV and PRG spokesmen were asked about the French initiative at their press briefings after the 61st session of the Paris talks on 2 April, but consistent with established practice Vietnamese communist media have not reported the briefings. The communist delegates at the Paris session repeated their charges that the United States is refusing to settle the war in Vietnam, is escalating its war in Laos, and is creating tensions in Cambodia and attempting to turn it into another Vietnam in the wake of Sihanouk's ouster.

Peking continues to devote more than half of its broadcast comment to Cambodia, and the first elite Chinese expression of support for Sihanouk comes in Chou En-lai's remark in Pyongyang on 5 April that the Chinese "Government" and people support the Prince's 23 March statement calling for a "liberation struggle" against the Lon Nol regime. Hanoi and Liberation Front media stress U.S. and GVN "collusion" with Premier Lon Nol in "suppressing the people's struggle" and scorn his call for an ICC or UN investigation of Vietnamese communist involvement in Cambodia.

PARIS TALKS: STRESS ON CAMBODIA, LAOS AT 2 APRIL SESSION

The VNA account of the 61st Paris session notes that both PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien and DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy warned that if the United States continues its "war of aggression" and expands it to the whole of Indochina, the Vietnamese, Laotian, and Khmer peoples "will unite and fight until complete victory." The LPA account reports that Tien quoted from the 26 March PRG statement supporting Sihanouk and claimed that U.S. policy on Cambodia is in keeping with long-standing American interference and aggression. (Similarly, DRV delegate Vy had read from the 25 March DRV Government statement on Cambodia at the Paris session on the 26th.) Tien remarked on the "illusory" nature of alleged U.S. hopes of achieving a position of strength on Indochina battlefields in order to exert pressure on the conference. The PRG delegate also said that the way out of the war in South Vietnam is to be found not in Vietnamization or in "expansion through the so-called Asian doctrine," but rather in the United States foregoing its "aggression and intervention" and respecting the rights of the Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian peoples. In this context,

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he is reported--by Liberation Radio but not in the VNA or LPA account--as having quoted Senate minority leader Hugh Scott for the statement that "the United States should withdraw from this boiling peninsula as soon as possible." (Hanoi radio on the 5th reports briefly that Senator Fulbright in his 2 April "major policy speech" told the Senate the Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodian issues are inseparable, that the only way out is through a political settlement, and that "the issue of who holds Indochina was of little importance to U.S. security.")

VNA, in summarizing DRV delegate Vy's remarks on Cambodia, notes his reference to Sihanouk's appeal having "pointed out" that the United States is the payer of bills if not the designer of the 18 March coup. But the account does not report Vy's remark ridiculing the Phnom Penh authorities for "cocking up stories--absurd to everyone--that the Viet Cong is marching on Phnom Penh."

VNA reports that in discussing Laos Vy recalled the NLHX Central Committee's 6 March statement as well as Souphanouvong's statement "condemning the systematic aggressive U.S. acts in Laos and refuting President Nixon's slanders against the DRV and deceitful arguments aimed at justifying the U.S. war escalation." However, the account does not report that Vy--in commenting on Ambassador Habib's remarks on U.S. policy at the previous session--said it is the United States "and no one else" which has violated the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos.

ALLIED The VNA account says the U.S. and Saigon delegates
STATEMENTS again eluded the "fundamental" questions and
 "blatantly" charged the DRV with intervening and
"jeopardizing the security of Laos and Cambodia." VNA states that Ambassador Lam again came out in defense of the "crimes" of war escalation in Laos, interference in Cambodia, and "plotting to expand the war to the whole of Indochina." As for Ambassador Habib, the "acting head" of the U.S. delegation is reported to have again broached the "so-called POW question" aimed at misleading world and U.S. public opinion, which VNA says is "strongly demanding that the U.S. imperialists put an end to its war of aggression."

VNA notes routinely that Tien and Vy "energetically" rebutted the allied delegates' "distortions."

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VC ROLE IN CAMBODIA DENIED; CALL FOR ICC, UN ACTION SCORED

Vietnamese communist media describe the situation in Cambodia as "increasingly serious" because the United States and the GVN continue to attack Cambodian territory in order to support the Lon Nol regime in its attempted suppression of the Khmer people's "patriotic struggle."* The propaganda also continues to take note of and deny Western charges of Vietnamese communist involvement in Cambodia. Thus, a Liberation Radio commentary on 31 March says that the Lon Nol "clique," in order to cover up its actions in collusion with the United States and Saigon, has made false accusations such as: "the demonstrations in Cambodia have been organized by Vietnamese people," and "the 'Viet Cong' armed forces have launched attacks in Cambodia." The commentary goes on to derisively acknowledge Cambodian proposals for the holding of talks with the DRV and the Front when it says the Lon Nol regime has issued "a so-called foreign ministry communique proposing the convening of a tripartite conference for a solution to the problem."

The denials of Vietnamese communist involvement are formalized in a 2 April PRG Foreign Ministry statement, carried by LPA on the same day, which rejects the "brazen slander" that the Vietnamese have "invaded" Cambodia. The statement claims that this type of "stock calumny" is often employed by the United States and its "henchmen" to conceal their "crimes of aggression."

On the same day both Hanoi and Liberation Radio score Cambodian Premier Lon Nol's request, made at his 30 March news conference, that the 1954 Geneva Conference cochairmen reactivate the ICC and that the UN Security Council send an observer team to Cambodia for the purpose of checking Vietnamese communist involvement in Cambodia. A Hanoi commentary says that acceding to these requests would be considered a "hostile act" against the Vietnamese and Cambodian peoples, would encourage Phnom Penh to pursue its repressive policies against the Khmer struggle, and would be tantamount to "tacitly recognizing" the legal character of the "coup leaders' clique." Lon Nol's "fabricated complaints" against Vietnam, according to the commentary, are part of the scheme aimed at "slandering the patriotic

* Liberation Radio announced on 2 April that as of the 3d it was expanding its Cambodian-language broadcasting from two to four half-hour shows daily. In addition, FBIS monitoring indicates that Hanoi radio's international service on 5 April added an additional half-hour of Cambodian-language programming, replacing a regular Japanese-language program with a Cambodian show.

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struggle of the Khmer people" and come at a time when the Phnom Penh authorities' position is "very unstable." In the same vein, Liberation Radio says that accession to Lon Nol's request would mean tacit recognition of the regime, as well as "delaying the liberation of the oppressed peoples" and siding with the imperialist cause.

NCNA duly reports Sihanouk's statements on a UN or ICC role in Cambodia. On 3 April it cites his 1 April message to U Thant, observing that the rightwing group in Phnom Penh is "at the end of its tether" and that UN intervention can "only arouse greater indignation among the Cambodian people." On 5 April NCNA carries Sihanouk's 2 April statement that the UN and ICC have "no right" to accept the request of an illegal government in Phnom Penh, although Peking is not known to have made any comment of its own on the proposal for an ICC role. The best solution all round, according to the deposed prince, would be for the ICC, the United Nations, and the participants in the 1954 Geneva Conference to enjoin the United States to leave Indochina without delay. While arguing that the ICC, United Nations and the Geneva Conference participants have "no right to poke their nose" into Indochinese affairs, Sihanouk also says, somewhat contradictorily, that the Geneva "powers," not the United Nations, are legally qualified to be concerned with Indochina.

Moscow propaganda is not known to have mentioned the call for ICC or UN inspection.

LON NOL-ALLIED "COOPERATION" In support of its charge of U.S. and GVN collaboration with the new Cambodian regime, VNA on 5 April cites LPA for the report that Cambodian Svay Rieng provincial officials met with the GVN's Tay Ninh province chief on 28 March to discuss joint action to repress the "Khmer people and Vietnamese nationals" in the area. Following this meeting, VNA says, the U.S. and Saigon forces used aircraft and artillery to attack many areas along the border. On 29 March, according to the report, the United States and South Vietnamese sent helicopters into a district of Kompong Cham Province to resupply Khmer government forces entrenched in a local position which two days later "was razed by the Khmer insurgents."

Hanoi says the "coup makers'" promise to maintain Cambodian neutrality is contradicted by Lon Nol's statements that he may ask for arms aid from the United States and other Western countries. A Hanoi radio broadcast on 6 April says "public opinion" is asking whether it is not true that the United States has already supplied weapons. In this connection, the broadcast casts doubt on the facts in the case of the U.S. ship "Columbia Eagle," hijacked by some of its crew members

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who diverted it from its destination in Thailand, where it was to deliver arms, and sailed it to Sihanoukville. The radio broadcast and a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on the same day claim that the French paper LE MONDE on 1 April called the arrival of the "Columbia Eagle" the first delivery of U.S. weapons to the Lon Nol "clique."

VOLUMINOUS PRC ATTENTION, CHOU EN-LAI SUPPORT FOR SIHANOUK

The bulk of Peking's voluminous propaganda on Cambodia continues to consist of Sihanouk statements, pickups of foreign statements of support for Sihanouk and editorialized reports of developments in Cambodia. But on 5 April the first avowal of Chinese "Government" support for Sihanouk is voiced by Premier Chou En-lai in a banquet speech during his visit to Pyongyang.

Taking note of the Prince's 23 March statement calling on the Cambodian people to unite in a liberation front to wage a resolute struggle against the United States and its "lackeys," Chou says specifically that "the Chinese Government and people firmly support this just stand taken by Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, head of state of Cambodia, and they consistently support the policy of independence, peace, neutrality, democracy, and defense of state sovereignty and territorial integrity firmly pursued by Samdech Norodom Sihanouk." Chou goes on to express the conviction that the Cambodians, "fighting shoulder to shoulder" with the Lao and Vietnamese peoples, will win complete victory in their "just struggle."

NCNA continues to highlight reports of antigovernment demonstrations in Cambodia, with an item on 1 April describing the Phnom Penh government as "panic-stricken" in the face of the people's "strong resistance." A 2 April NCNA report notes the reported deaths of General Lon Nol's brother and two Assembly deputies at the hands of pro-Sihanouk demonstrators and comments that these incidents amply demonstrate "that the Cambodian people find the criminal acts of the rightist coup d'etat absolutely intolerable." On the 5th NCNA claims that a "reign of white terror" prevails in many areas of Cambodia.

In addition to carrying Sihanouk statements, NCNA mentions on 2 April that Cambodia's former representative to the United Nations Huot Sambath arrived in Peking on 1 April "to report to Prince Norodom Sihanouk, head of state of Cambodia, for consultation."

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MOSCOW PROPAGANDA WARNS OF EXPANSION OF WAR

Soviet propaganda on Cambodia continues to stress charges of U.S. intent to expand the war into Cambodia. Moscow also continues to note reports of pro-Sihanouk demonstrations in Cambodia and to cite some of Sihanouk's messages. For example, a 6 April TASS report briefly notes the Prince's 4 April message to the Cambodian people and his call on them to refrain from exposing themselves in antigovernment demonstrations, since they would be more useful in the "armed struggle." TASS also quotes Sihanouk as saying this "struggle will begin in the jungles because it is the only way for the Cambodian people to win and implement their ideals."

ROUTINE VNA, LPA REPORTS ON STEPPED-UP ACTION IN VIETNAM

The Vietnamese communist shellings and ground attacks beginning on 31 March are reported routinely by LPA and VNA, generally with no indication that they marked a sharp upturn in the level of fighting. However, a commentary in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 3 April, broadcast by Hanoi radio the same day, does say that the series of "fierce, concerted attacks" from 31 March to 2 April "have smashed the U.S. aggressors' deceitful statement that their battlefield situation has been stabilized and the 'Viet Cong' can no longer launch big attacks because they have been driven toward the border." VNA typically cites Western press reports in noting the threat to the Dak Seang special forces camp in Kontum Province and in claiming that firebase "Schroeder" in the Mekong Delta, recently handed over to the ARVN, was overrun.

"CALAMITY" FOR ARVN DIVISIONS A Hanoi radio commentary on 3 April, broadcast in Vietnamese to the South, pegs its prediction of ultimate failure of Vietnamization to the alleged defeat of "U.S.-puppet sweep and pacification operations in the U Minh area" from 8 to 17 March at the hands of the Rach Gia and Ca Mau forces. The commentary claims that this was not the first time the 9th and 21st "puppet" divisions and "puppet" marines sustained serious losses, and it declares that since the Vietnamization policy was instituted the South Vietnamese main force divisions have had their battalions and regiments decimated.

The broadcast points to the precarious position of the 5th division in the Mekong Delta and claims that "calamity has befallen and will certainly befall" units of the 5th, 7th, 9th, 18th, and 21st divisions. It refers to "pitiful setbacks" of the accelerated pacification plan--"the ray of hope" for the U.S. Vietnamization plan--but seems to register some concern in its concluding plea: "We must further

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accelerate the building of guerrilla and self-defense forces, step up attacks against the enemy everywhere, and join these forces with regular and regional troops to smash the pacification plan."

COMMUNIQUE DECRY "WAR CRIMES" IN NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM

VNA reports on 2 April that the DRV War Crimes Commission issued a special communique dated 31 March "on the criminal acts perpetrated by the Nixon Administration" against the population of Noong De and Muong Xen areas, Nghe An Province, on 27 and 28 March. The communique charges that the Administration "has once more trampled underfoot its own predecessor's solemn declaration of 1 November 1968 on the unconditional ending of all bombardments against the DRV." Condemning the alleged attacks, it claims that "30 civilians were killed or wounded, a school was demolished, and many dwellings were burnt down."

On the 3d, VNA reports a 2 April War Crimes Commission communique on "crimes" committed by the United States in both North and South Vietnam during March. In the South, the communique routinely denounces the use of toxic chemicals, tactical air strikes, B-52 strikes and carpet bombings, and the accelerated pacification program as "crimes". In the North, it decries the continuance of reconnaissance missions and charges that 59 attacks were made by U.S. tactical and strategic planes. It cites the alleged 27-28 March attack on Nghe An Province and repeats the stock charge that artillery attacks were made from U.S. ships.

On 7 April LPA carries a communique issued on the 3d by the South Vietnam War Crimes Commission condemning alleged U.S. crimes during the first quarter of 1970. Listing numerous examples, the communique claims that "crimes" were intensified in four basic categories: increased terror sweeps and massacre of civilians; greater use of toxic chemicals and gases to "massacre" people and ruin crops; "wanton" attacks by U.S. aircraft, including B-52's, on populated areas; and suppression and persecution of the people in urban areas.

COMMENT ON STUDENT STRIKE, GVN LAND REFORM, DISABLED VETERANS

Current Vietnamese communist attacks on the Thieu regime focus primarily on the student strike in protest over the recent arrest of student leaders, with some continued attention to the Land Reform Law. In addition to continuing Liberation and Hanoi radio comment on the students' "struggle," the Hanoi broadcast press review indicates that this subject is currently a staple of North Vietnamese press comment.

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Attention to the GVN's land reform includes Liberation Radio's broadcast on the 2d of an appeal from the South Vietnamese Liberation Peasants' Association. The appeal echoes earlier comment in calling the law deceitful and reactionary and says all peasants must expose and reject it. Declaring that in 1962 the peasants "staged general uprisings" and that in the past 10 years the liberated rural areas have been increasingly expanded and "more than two million hectares or ricefields . . . returned to our peasants," the appeal asks where the Saigon administration can get ricefields.

Hanoi radio on 3 April broadcasts a commentary attributed to Nguyen Que which discusses the plight of disabled ARVN veterans and claims that the "Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique" is waging a "pacification war" against the veterans and their families and is razing the huts where they have been living in Saigon. The commentary concludes with the observation that those soldiers who continue to fight for the "U.S.-Thieu clique" should learn from the miserable life of their disabled colleagues and stop serving as mercenaries.

DRV ASSEMBLY STANDING COMMITTEE, FATHERLAND FRONT MEET

Hanoi radio on 1 April broadcasts the text of a DRV National Assembly Standing Committee communique announcing that a regular session was held on 31 March under vice-chairman Hoang Van Hoan. According to the radio, "after discussions" the Standing Committee "unanimously endorsed" the Council of Ministers assessment of realization of the 1969 state plan and the 1969 state budget and adopted the directives, tasks, and main targets of the 1970 state plan and budget. The communique says that at the proposal of the Council of Ministers, the committee decided to award a first-class independence order to the "Young Volunteers Against U.S. Aggression" for outstanding achievements. The committee also decided "on a number of questions concerning decisions of the People's Supreme Court."

This is the third consecutive Standing Committee meeting from which Chairman Truong Chinh has been absent. He failed to attend a "recent" one reported by VNA on 19 March and the 18-19 February session. However, Chinh addressed the Working Youth Union meeting in celebration of its 39th anniversary on 24 March.

FATHERLAND FRONT DRV media on 5 April report that the Vietnam
ENLARGED SESSION Fatherland Front Central Committee (VFFCC) held
 its enlarged session on 1 April under the
 chairmanship of Ton Duc Thang, President of the VFFCC Presidium.
Also on the 5th, Hanoi radio broadcasts the text of "an important
resolution" adopted at the session and VNA reviews a NHAN DAN editorial

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hailing the success of the meeting. The VNA account reports that Tran Dang Khoa, member of the VFFCC presidium, delivered a political report* and that General Vo Nguyen Giap addressed the session. Ton Duc Thang in his opening remarks routinely praised the peoples of the South as well as the North, reaffirmed the people's determination to carry out President Ho's will, and applauded the "constant development of the militant solidarity" among the people of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

According to VNA, Giap "exposed the U.S. scheme to 'Vietnamize the war,' an extremely perfidious design" aimed at prolonging the war and expanding it to all of Indochina, and routinely predicted that the United States would meet with "complete failure." The immediate tasks of the North's people, according to Giap, are to put Ho's testament into practice.

In addition to supporting the recent DRV Government statements on Laos and Cambodia, the resolution set forth four main tasks for the Fatherland Front: mobilizing the people to exert efforts to support the South and protect the North; mobilizing all labor forces to increase productivity; assisting in the development of socialist democracy and the guarantee of the right of collective ownership of the working people; and being resolutely determined to support the "just struggle" of the Khmer and Laotian peoples and to develop "the international activities of the front and various organizations."

* In recent years the VFF Central Committee has met semiannually--once in the spring and once in the fall. The 17th and 18th meetings were announced by Hanoi on 31 March and 3 October 1969, respectively, and the major reports were delivered by VFF presidium member Hoang Quoc Viet.

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P R C A N D D P R K

CHOU VISIT CAPS WARMING TREND IN PEKING-PYONGYANG RELATIONS

Chou En-lai's 5-7 April visit to North Korea marks the culmination of a warming trend in PRC relations with North Korea which has been apparent since last September. Chou's visit followed the arrival of a new PRC ambassador in Pyongyang on 24 March--the first Chinese ambassador in North Korea since November of 1966, the year that relations between the two countries cooled.* The last high-level Chinese visit to North Korea had been made by Liu Shao-chi in September 1963. Chou En-lai was last in North Korea on a goodwill visit in February 1958. Except for his trip to North Vietnam for Ho Chi Minh's funeral in September 1969, he had not traveled abroad since the beginning of the cultural revolution, when he visited Romania in June 1966.

Chou's activities in Pyongyang included attending banquets on 6 and 7 April and addressing a Pyongyang city meeting on the 7th. Kim and Chou had talks on 5 and 6 April which both sides described as "cordial and friendly." At the banquet on the 7th Kim said the two leaders had reached a "complete unanimity of views," and in his departure speech at the airport that day Chou pointed to the "very fruitful results" of the visit. Reports and speeches on both sides stress the close friendship of the two peoples, "sealed in blood," and recall that Chinese volunteers participated in the Korean War.

Speeches made by Kim and Chou during the visit underlined a need for greater unity of their countries in the face of allegedly intensified U.S. and Japanese aggressiveness in Asia. The tone was set in the arrival speeches at the airport on the 5th. Welcoming Chou, Kim stressed that the people of the two countries are "close comrades-in-arms and brothers fighting shoulder to shoulder against the common enemies--Japanese militarism and U.S. imperialism." He asserted that a "tense situation" has been created in Asia as a result of U.S. and Japanese aggressive moves and that Chou's visit "at this juncture is an event of great significance." In reply, Chou declared that relations between the Chinese and the Koreans are "like lips and teeth" and that they are "intimate brothers." He too recalled that they fought shoulder to shoulder against the United States and Japan.

* The DPRK ambassador to the PRC returned to Peking in February after an absence since September 1967. See the FBIS TRENDS of 4 February, page 28, and 25 February, pages 12-13, for discussions of Sino-Korean relations.

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He stated that in conditions in which the United States and Japan are intensifying aggression against China, Korea, the "three countries of Indochina," and other Asian countries, the strengthening of Chinese and Korean unity "is of great significance."

MUTUAL CONCERN
ABOUT JAPAN

Chou's visit signaled a return to the style of personal diplomacy practiced by the Chinese before their isolationist withdrawal during the cultural revolution.

At the same time, it reflected Peking's intent to redress the imbalance between ideological concerns--which dominated its conduct in foreign affairs during the cultural revolution--and basic national interests, the frequent victim of ideological excesses in recent years.* This aspect of the visit is associated in particular with the concern shared by Peking and Pyongyang over the prospect of a growing Japanese role in the area, especially as envisaged in the Nixon Administration's new Asian policy. In their comment on the U.S.-Japanese communique following Premier Sato's visit to the United States last November, Peking and Pyongyang have echoed one another's expressed fears that Japan will seek to serve traditional U.S. policies in Asia as Washington reduces the direct U.S. involvement in the area. Thus, sounding major themes in Chinese comment, Chou in his 5 April speech assailed the Nixon-Sato communique as representing "a new stage" in U.S.-Japanese military cooperation and denounced Sato's remarks indicating that Japan regards Taiwan and South Korea as areas of concern to Japanese security.

Though Peking's rivalry with Moscow remained muted during Chou's visit, Chinese resentment over Soviet dealings with Japan--expressed in a 31 March NCNA charge that Moscow had sold out Soviet sovereignty by granting Siberian air rights to Japan--was reflected in Chou's assertion on 5 April that the attitude taken toward Japan is an important criterion for distinguishing between "genuine and sham" revolution, socialism, and Marxism-Leninism. Having thus used language reminiscent of Peking's ideological contest with Moscow, Chou sought to associate Pyongyang with this view, quoting the North Koreans as having said the same thing in their statement that one's position on Japan "is a question of fundamental stand."

* A muting of Maoist evangelism is evident in the manner in which Chou linked Mao's thought with Marxism-Leninism. According to texts of Chou's speeches released by NCNA, he referred to "Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tsetung Thought" as guiding the Chinese. In the course of the cultural revolution, as part of an effort to enshrine Mao's thought as the ultimate authority for China and the world revolutionary movement generally, Peking sought to associate Mao more intimately and equally with the leading communist deities by adopting the formula "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought."

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The North Koreans had, in fact, made such a statement recently in a long article in NODONG SINMUN on 30 March (carried textually by KCNA) recounting the evils of "Japanese militarism" reaching back to the mid-19th century. After dealing at length with Japan's role according to the Nixon Doctrine and with the implications of the Nixon-Sato communique, the article turned to the dangers of bargaining with the Sato government. Expressing Pyongyang's long-standing demand for a tough line on Japan, the article insisted that, as regards the dangers posed by West Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia, it is improper to take an attitude of "making a point of one and neglecting the other." It added a warning that a "catastrophic price" would be paid for acting on the basis of "national egoism" and ignoring the interests of "the anti-imperialist struggle as a whole" while blinded by "momentary interests." It was in this context that the statement quoted by Chou appeared, followed by a passage demanding concerted action against "Japanese militarism." Driving the point home, the article said that the socialist countries "above all" should play a major role in this struggle and that they can be true to their international duty only if they maintain "an invariable stand of principle" regarding Japan.

Chou returned to this theme, with its clear anti-Soviet overtones, in his speech on the 7th in which he complained that "some people talk about opposing imperialism" but are actually conducting "an ardent flirtation" with the United States and Japan. Chou thus managed skillfully to exploit a matter of mutual concern to Peking and Pyongyang, serving Peking's interests both in breaking out of its isolation and in securing an important flank in its confrontation with the Soviets. Though Pyongyang sedulously avoids being identified with either side in the Sino-Soviet conflict, Chou's visit has underscored a convergence of interest and a corresponding decline in ideological tensions between Peking and Pyongyang.

* A NODONG SINMUN editorial article on 16 November 1967, for example, demanded that "all" the socialist countries must recognize the Japanese danger in Asia and devote the same attention to it as to the West German threat in Europe.

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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

POLITBURO RANKINGS CLARIFIED, CHANG CHUN-CHIAO IN HIGH PLACE

NCNA's 5 April account of Chou En-lai's departure for Pyongyang has further clarified the relative ranking of CCP Politburo members. When the new Politburo was named last year, NCNA adopted a policy of listing the members according to stroke order, the Chinese equivalent of alphabetical order. On subsequent occasions, with only a few Politburo members present, this policy has been modified to permit a listing by rank. In such listings Huang Yung-sheng, chief of the general staff, has been listed next after members of the Politburo standing committee. But on 5 April, Shanghai chief Chang Chun-chiao, who has been absent from Peking and has not appeared with other leaders since last May Day, was named first after members of the standing committee, ahead of Huang.

Chiang Ching probably ranks above Chang Chun-chiao and immediately following the members of the standing committee, but her name has not appeared in any nonstroke-order listing. The most recent indication of her status came in a 2 April NCNA account of the memorial service for Anna Louise Strong, which grouped the wreath sent by Chiang Ching with those sent by members of the Standing Committee. Lin Piao's wife Yeh Chun, also a Politburo member of undetermined rank, was the only leading woman not listed as having sent a wreath; the wives of Chou En-lai, Kang Sheng, and Li Fu-chun were all said to have sent wreaths.

Included in Chou's delegation to North Korea is a relatively minor official, Yang Te-chung, who was first identified by KCNA in English as a member of the secretariat of the CCP, an office not referred to in PRC media since the purge of Teng Hsiao-ping. KCNA probably made a translation error, and the reference may be to the General Office of the Central Committee. The Korean term used for Yang's title was "Pan Kong Chong," a term not commonly used but which would mean "general office." The first reference in recent years to the General Office of the Central Committee came in a 20 March NCNA report on the activities of the office's "7 May school."

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

SOVIET MEDIA SUSTAIN ATTACKS ON PRC LEADERS, POLICIES

Continuing to play up a picture of China plagued by economic chaos and teeming with political unrest, Moscow points to the disruptive international impact of Maoism and invokes foreign communist censure of the Maoist leadership to underscore the idea of a collective world communist indictment.

An article by R. Sokolov in the ultraorthodox SOVIET RUSSIA on 2 April, the third article on China in this paper within a week, recapitulates the main lines of Moscow's critique of Maoism which had marked Soviet polemics prior to the propaganda standdown that followed Kosygin's meeting with Chou En-lai last September. Using the anathema formula "Mao Tse-tung group" to indicate an illegitimate faction which usurped control of the CCP, the article draws on comments by several foreign communists as well as Brezhnev to justify its hardline condemnation of Maoism as a pernicious heresy that cannot be ignored by the communist movement. The article characteristically pictures two lines vying for control of the CCP in a struggle reaching back to the 1930's--"the Marxist-Leninist internationalist trend," or pro-Soviet line, and "the petty bourgeois nationalist trend" represented by Maoism, which is described as a collection of views "profoundly hostile" to Marxism-Leninism. Repeating a judgment made in Soviet comment on the CCP congress last year, the article claims that the Chinese party is in a state of "such profound crisis" that its very existence as a Marxist-Leninist body is in question.

The article's uncompromising approach is reflected in its citation of the programmatic joint editorial carried in PEOPLE'S DAILY and RED FLAG on 11 November 1965, a landmark document which signalled Peking's determination to reject the line of united action proposed by Moscow and, by implication, repudiated those elements in Peking favoring an accommodation with the Soviets. In citing that document now, SOVIET RUSSIA appears to be arguing for a hard line against Peking and seeking to deflate any earlier hopes that the Sino-Soviet talks might contribute to an accommodation on a range of issues.

Though the Sokolov article is mainly designed to discredit Maoism ideologically, it alludes to the border conflict in observing that the Chinese have engaged in "direct military provocations" against the Soviet Union and are devoting their resources to preparing for war and to subversive activities within the socialist camp. It concludes with the ritualistic disclaimer that the Soviets do not identify China with the Mao group and the belief that China's "present tragedy" is a temporary phenomenon.

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A 4 April TASS report, widely carried by the central press the next day, sees an alleged new purge of the commanding personnel of the PLA as indicating that the Maoist leadership does not regard even the army--upon which it relies as "its main support"--as a reliable instrument. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on 2 April focuses on peasant resistance, citing excessive sentences meted out to Chinese peasants who have shown disrespect to "the great helmsman" through such unforgivable acts as allowing a portrait of Chairman Mao to be placed in a broody hen's nest or permitting the great leader's face to be gnawed at by cockroaches.

Moscow's Mandarin broadcasts for Chinese listeners contain the usual recollection of past Soviet aid to the PRC and assertions of present Soviet desires for a normalization of relations, coupled with the stock portrayal of Peking's policies as giving aid and comfort to the West. A substantial amount of comment on the first anniversary of the ninth CCP congress embellishes the theme that the congress was called to rubber-stamp the "illegal," anti-Soviet actions of the already established military-bureaucratic dictatorship. Moscow challenges various sectors of Chinese society--particularly the youth and the military--to find anything in the proceedings or in the results of the congress which benefits them.

PEKING MOCKS SOVIET ECONOMIC WOES, REMAINS SILENT ON BORDER

For the second time in two weeks the Chinese have sought to play upon widespread speculation about a Soviet leadership crisis resulting from economic troubles. An NCNA commentary on 4 April, claiming that the Brezhnev leadership has shifted the blame for its failures onto lower-level scapegoats, taunts Brezhnev "and his ilk" for being unable to improve Soviet agricultural performance in the more than five years since Khrushchev's ouster. Reviving an epithet used against Khrushchev, the commentary charges that the Brezhnev leadership has promoted a "phony communism" which has been discredited by the Soviet people, who have shown "strong dissatisfaction" over their leaders' policies. The "new tsars' throne is tottering," the commentary adds.

Though the NCNA commentary mentions the "Hitler-like policy" of diverting resources to the needs of "social imperialism's expansion and aggression abroad" as contributing to Soviet economic woes, Peking has continued its restraint on sensitive bilateral issues and has refrained from responding to heavy Soviet propaganda attacks on the Chinese war preparations campaign. Authoritative comment commemorating the CCP congress held last April--to which Lin Biao submitted a political report sharply denouncing Moscow for having

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aggressive designs against China--gives short shrift to Sino-Soviet relations. A 1 April PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial alludes only in passing to "social imperialism," while an article in RED FLAG No. 4 (released by NCNA on 1 April) has little more to say on the subject than to quote Lin's warning in his congress report that the danger of war being launched by "U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism" should not be overlooked. A 6 April NCNA report on a speech in Peking by a representative of a Japanese delegation of "friendly" firms quotes him as denouncing the Soviets for committing provocations on the Sino-Soviet border, but Peking has avoided comment on the border conflict.

Thus, while resuming attacks on Soviet domestic policy after having fallen silent on this subject following the opening of talks, Peking has carefully avoided feeding the Soviet propaganda machine's campaign to depict the Chinese as intransigent and bellicose. Peking's low posture on explosive Sino-Soviet issues accords with an interest in keeping the talks going and defusing the border conflict while probing other vulnerable areas of Soviet policy.

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WEST GERMANY

MOSCOW, EAST BERLIN TAKE DIFFERENT TACKS ON BRANDT U.S. VISIT

While Soviet advance comment on FRG Chancellor Brandt's U.S. visit views it primarily as a West German effort to overcome "serious conflicts" and the "considerable divergence of opinion" between the two countries on European affairs, East German comment points with concern to a "harmony" of viewpoints between Brandt and the "imperialist" Nixon Administration.

A Moscow foreign-language broadcast on 1 April predicts that "purely military matters" will dominate talks between Chancellor Brandt and President Nixon this week, noting that the question of FRG compensation for American troops in West Germany is high on the agenda. Moscow media note that FRG "war" minister Schmidt will accompany Brandt and that Brandt "will try to persuade" U.S. Congressmen seeking a reduction of U.S. forces in West Germany that they should change their minds and maintain the U.S. presence.

A Moscow domestic commentary on the 5th sees the "contradictory trends" in U.S.-FRG relations concerning the U.S. role in Europe as part of the general NATO divisions "inevitable" in the rivalry among "imperialist powers in that aggressive alliance." Remarking that there is an "invisible trade war" between the United States and the EEC, TASS correspondent Borisov on the 4th says "it is obvious Bonn is not going to satisfy all the U.S. demands" in regard to the EEC and trade barriers. Borisov notes in passing that "coordination" of FRG and U.S. policies toward the socialist countries also will be discussed, while a 1 April Zholkver comment broadcast by Moscow to German listeners specifies that Brandt will discuss with President Nixon the FRG's contacts with the USSR, Poland and the GDR.

An East Berlin radio commentator on the 6th predicts that the results of Brandt's visit will permit further conclusions regarding the "credibility" of his foreign policy, particularly toward the socialist states. The commentator concludes in advance, however, that Brandt's statements and performance already indicate that his "Ostpolitik" is "nothing but a part of the general imperialist global strategy, with the initiators and those mainly responsible for it sitting in Washington," and that Brandt's visit to Washington will in no way render this policy more credible.

Bonn's support for the "murderous U.S. policy in Southeast Asia" is denounced by SED Politburo member Norden in a 4 April speech at a Moscow World Peace Council presidium conference. Norden finds "highly

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disquieting" Brandt's statements that he wants to pursue a West German policy "in Nixon's sense." Denouncing the U.S. Administration as "murderers" of Negroes, Vietnamese, and Arabs, Norden asserts that Brandt's expressions of solidarity and "a joint foreign policy with Nixon" call for "the greatest measure of mistrust."

EAST GERMANS DENOUNCE ALLEGED EFFORTS TO UNDERCUT KASSEL SUMMIT

"False reports" in the West German and West Berlin press to the effect that arrests were made in the GDR following the Stoph-Brandt summit in Erfurt on 19 March are denounced in a GDR Interior Ministry press office statement carried by ADN on 6 April. Such reports, the statement says, "are obviously aimed at encumbering and harassing" the second summit planned for 21 May at Kassel.

Concern about the status of GDR Premier Stoph when he enters the FRG for the Kassel summit is expressed by the GDR-controlled clandestine radio "German Freedom Station 904" on 25 March. The radio says Stoph might be subject to arrest unless there is legal action to abolish the FRG's "handcuff law" treating GDR citizens as persons "who temporarily have the status of a criminal with safe conduct." It complains that currently some "fascist" West German newspapers are "most impudently slandering and abusing" Stoph, Brandt's negotiating partner.

East Berlin comment on the impending second Stoph-Brandt meeting continues to press along established lines for a change in West German policy and legal recognition of the GDR. SED Politburo member Norden stresses in his 4 April Moscow speech that the GDR's "repeated offers for negotiations" have prevented FRG leaders from making "any more evasions" and that "they had to begin and must now continue the talks with the GDR, and this might mean progress."

ULBRICHT, BREZHNEV In his speech at the Hungarian National Assembly's
COMMENT ON GERMANY 3 April jubilee session marking Hungary's
 liberation anniversary, Ulbricht restates
standard GDR demands for recognition, praises the GDR draft treaty as
a basis for negotiations, and again criticizes Brandt by name for
"evasion of basic questions" at Erfurt. Ulbricht stresses the need
for "solid guarantees," not "empty declarations" by the FRG.

Brezhnev's remarks on Germany at the Hungarian session, his first public comment on this topic in nearly six months, fall short of giving outright endorsement to the GDR's stock demand for international legal recognition but come a step nearer than his 6 October GDR anniversary speech in Berlin. Brezhnev avoids specific reference to the FRG, noting only that "revanchist threats" continue in the West, but asserts that "respect for the state sovereignty of the GDR" is a

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part of the "indispensable condition for a really lasting European settlement." He defines this condition as "recognition of state frontiers and other realities on the continent as well as recognition of the results of World War II and subsequent developments"--a stereotyped Soviet formulation.

Brezhnev reaffirms Moscow's support for last year's Budapest appeal for the convening of an all-European security conference. Without specifying the two broad agenda items suggested for this conference at last October's meeting of Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers in Prague, Brezhnev says the conference should deal with problems "where the views are closest to each other."

GDR DECRIES CONSCRIPTION OF WEST BERLINERS INTO BUNDESWEHR

East German media report the "condemnation" by a GDR Foreign Ministry spokesman on 3 April of "illegal conscription" of West Berlin men into the FRG Bundeswehr as part of "illegal actions" intended "to include West Berlin in the rearmament policy of the FRG." On the 2d a GDR Foreign Ministry statement expressed dissatisfaction with the "suspension" of the "allied travel bureau" in West Berlin, announced on 26 March, demanding that this office be permanently closed to end "discrimination against GDR citizens." Also on the 2d, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND noted that "contrary to international law," FRG President Heinemann will again carry out "official business" in the "special political entity" of West Berlin in a four-day "working visit" starting 15 April.

A 3 April NEUES DEUTSCHLAND commentary states that "to this day" West German "imperialism" persists in attempts to "get its foot in the door" in West Berlin and continues to "misuse this independent political entity on GDR territory" for provocations against the GDR.

TASS has reported the East German official complaints without comment.

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HUNGARIAN ANNIVERSARY

BREZHNEV ADMONISHES HUNGARIANS ON BLOC OBLIGATIONS

Addressing a 3 April meeting in Budapest on Hungary's 25th liberation anniversary, Soviet delegation leader Brezhnev called attention to the principle "once expounded by Comrade Kadar" to the effect that "no nationalist interests of socialist countries should prevail at the expense of the international interests of socialism." PRAVDA's editorial on the anniversary three days later echoes this sentiment almost verbatim, prefaced by "life convincingly confirms" The admonition, reminding Kadar of his long-standing firm support of bloc cooperation, is similar to statements in recent Soviet articles--by Fadeyev on CEMA in the 27 March IZVESTIYA and by Yakubovskiy in KOMMUNIST No. 5 on the Warsaw Pact--which appeared to be aimed primarily at the Romanians.

Kadar had made the statement cited by Brezhnev in a 23 November 1968 speech on the 50th anniversary of the MSZMP and in an interview with L'UNITA correspondent Giuseppe Boffa, published both in that paper and in NEPSZABADSAG on 1 December 1969. In both instances Kadar had been speaking in the context of a correct balancing of national and international interests--a standard Hungarian line. Presumably for this reason, PRAVDA's summary of the L'UNITA interview, also on 1 December 1969, excluded the passage in question.

Now, in his speech just preceding Brezhnev's at the 3 April anniversary meeting, Kadar stressed anew a "coordination of the common principal rules applying to all countries with national characteristics and an obligatory observance of each country's own peculiar endowments." While giving due attention to the 1956 "counterrevolution," the Warsaw Pact and CEMA, and Hungarian-Soviet friendship ("the firmest support" of "our national independence"), Kadar served notice that Hungary would continue to develop "mutually advantageous contacts," chiefly in trade, with noncommunist countries as well. Defensively, he declared that his country would "carry on imperturbably" its foreign policy, based not on "petty speculations" but on "principle," and that "our country has fulfilled all its international obligations thus far and will also do so in the future."

In addition to Brezhnev, the only other party chieftains from the European communist countries to attend the Budapest festivities were the GDR's Ulbricht and Czechoslovakia's Husak. Poland sent Premier Cyrankiewicz rather than Gomulka; and Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia sent politburo-level figures Mikhailov, Bodnaras, and Hodza, respectively. Politburo-level representatives, including the then

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Soviet President Mikoyan, had attended Hungary's 20th liberation anniversary in 1965, an occasion to which Radio Moscow devoted about the same volume of its total comment as to the present more prestigious jubilee affair.

Brezhnev reinforced his admonition regarding bloc obligations in an interview carried in NEPSZABADSAG on the 3d, pointedly remarking that "the Hungarian people are aware . . . through their own experiences" of imperialism's alleged efforts to "reverse the growth of revolutionary forces." And Husak, in his speech at the Budapest anniversary meeting, said "we still vividly remember the attempt at a counterrevolution in Hungary in 1956." He added that "a similar attempt" was made in Czechoslovakia by antisocialists who, "having learned from events in Hungary, chose more flexible tactics."

RCP Permanent Presidium member Bodnaras, the only foreign repeater from the 1965 Budapest festivities, registered a strong reassertion of Bucharest's current line to the effect that it will cooperate not only with the members of CEMA and the Warsaw Pact but with "all the socialist states." The same line was stressed by RCP Executive Committee member Danalache at a factory meeting in Bucharest the same day in honor of the Hungarian liberation anniversary.

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LATIN AMERICA

FRG ENVOY'S MURDER IN GUATEMALA EVOKES MIXED REACTIONS

Communist reactions to the murder of West German Ambassador to Guatemala Count Karl von Spreti on 5 April by the Cuban-oriented Guatemalan guerrilla organization, the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), ranges from suggestions by Havana, Moscow, and East Berlin that the Guatemalan Government is responsible for his death to a bitter denunciation of the guerrillas by Belgrade. Across the board, however, comment on the incident has been generally restrained in apparent recognition of the fact that diplomats from communist countries are also vulnerable to kidnaping attempts, as demonstrated by the abortive effort to kidnap a Soviet diplomat in Argentina on 29 March.

HAVANA Havana media reported extensively and for the most part factually on the murder and its diplomatic repercussions, although one broadcast noted that von Spreti had been "revolutionarily executed." The only Cuban comment on the subject available so far, in a 6 April Havana domestic service discussion program, seems to blame only the Guatemalan regime for the ambassador's death. One panelist notes that while in the recent kidnaping of the Guatemalan foreign minister and of U.S. diplomat Sean Holly the government met FAR demands for the release of guerrillas "who were being tortured and unjustly held," in this case it "flatly refused to discuss the release of the FRG Ambassador with the FAR." The killing is described as a result of the "long history of brutal repression of the Guatemalan people" which began in 1954 "when Castillo Armas, backed by the CIA and the U.S. Government, overthrew the Arbenz government."

While Cuban comment on past diplomatic kidnapings has been sparse, Havana has generally lauded them as worthy revolutionary exploits. For example, a 10 March Radio Havana commentary hailed the successful prisoner exchange for Holly's freedom as "a resounding blow against the oligarchical regime . . . and North American imperialism." On 30 September, welcoming Brazilian revolutionaries exchanged for U.S. Ambassador Elbrick, Castro lauded the Elbrick kidnaping as a "sensational" feat--"a humiliation, a smashing blow to imperialism and its lackeys in Brazil."

MOSCOW In the only Soviet comment on the murder available so far, a Radio Moscow domestic service commentary on the 7th suggests that Guatemalan authorities refused to ransom the West German envoy in order to make use of his death "as a pretext for cracking down on all dissidents." The commentary does not mention the FAR and contains no criticism of the killers, remarking that "many details are

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still unknown," although a TRANSPRESS dispatch on the same day reported that the Soviet embassy in Brazil had issued a note condemning the killing and affirming that "Marxists are against individual terror."

TASS on 30 March reported a Soviet note to Argentina protesting the attempt to kidnap a Soviet diplomat and the harassment of the embassy staff. While TASS on 1 April reported the Argentine reply, promising to insure the safety of the Soviet embassy and its staff, a Radio Moscow commentary the same day charged that a "fascist" organization including "members of the political police" was implicated in the abortive kidnaping of the Soviet diplomat and that "the general atmosphere of anticommunism" prevalent in Argentina promotes expansion of "the fascist movement."

EAST BERLIN The most extensive comment on the slaying comes from East Berlin. While initial reports reflected some confusion--with East Berlin television on the 6th first terming the kidnapers "anarchist forces" and later "anti-imperialist forces"--subsequent commentaries have placed prime responsibility on the Guatemalan regime. Thus, a Deutschlandsender commentary on the 7th sees confirmation of the theory that Guatemalan leaders "deliberately provoked" von Spreti's death to justify "a cruel terror campaign" against opponents of the regime. Other East Berlin comment implies that Bonn shares some of the guilt because it has maintained amicable relations with a regime that terrorizes and starves its citizens. An East Berlin domestic service commentary on 7 April urges listeners to "think more of the Guatemalans than of the ambassador of the imperialist Bonn state who had to sacrifice his life for the fact that his state, his society, is backing the criminal exploitation regime in Guatemala and profiting from it."

BELGRADE By contrast, Belgrade's POLITIKA on 6 April deplores the killing as "a vandalistic act of terrorism which may not only compromise the Guatemalan guerrillas but also their endeavors, goals, and methods of struggle." Yugoslavia's own diplomats have been victimized by Ustashi terrorist attempts in West Germany.

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